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The Incidence and Cost of
Wrongfully Denied Unemployment Benefits
Abstract
Since 1987, the U.S. Department of Labor has performed random audits of 
Unemployment Insurance (Ul) payments in order to estimate the extent of benefit 
payment errors   particularly overpayments. However, the accuracy of the process 
that determines benefit eligibility is not currently assessed. In particular, the extent to 
which eligible claimants for Ul are wrongfully denied benefits is not known.
This paper reports the results of the Denied Claims Accuracy (DCA) Pilot 
Project, a five-state pilot conducted by the Department of Labor during 1997-98, in 
which random samples of monetary, separation, and nonseparation denials were 
subjected to intensive field investigation in order to determine their accuracy. Two 
main sets of findings are reported. The first pertains to the incidence of wrongful 
denials: After adjusting for appeals, redeterminations, and other agency actions to 
resolve errors, 11 percent of monetary denials, over 6 percent of the separation 
denials, and 13 percent of nonseparation denials were in error. Several aspects of 
these basic findings are discussed: the effectiveness of Ul agency activities and the 
appeals process in correcting errors, the causes of wrongful denials, and the extent to 
which wrongful denials are correlated with observable claimant characteristics.
The second set of findings pertains to the dollar value of benefits lost by 
claimants due to wrongful denials. Lost benefits are unobservable and must be 
imputed; two approaches to making the imputations are developed. The imputations 
suggest that between $565 million and $625 million in benefits were wrongfully 
denied in the United States during fiscal year 1998, amounting to just over 3 percent of 
total regular Ul benefit payments. Of this total, between $220 million and $240 million 
were wrongfully denied due to incorrect monetary determinations, between $190 
million and $230 million were wrongfully denied due to incorrect separation 
determinations, and between $150 and $155 million were wrongfully denied due to 
incorrect nonseparation determinations.
The Incidence and Cost of Wrongfully Denied Unemployment Benefits
Unemployment Insurance (Ul) is intended to be a source of short-term income 
support for workers who experience involuntary unemployment and are seeking 
reemployment. When a worker becomes unemployed, he or she must claim Ul 
benefits and meet three basic eligibility criteria in order to receive benefits. First, the 
worker's pre-unemployment earnings must meet or exceed specified thresholds 
  that is, the worker must be "monetarily eligible" for benefits. Second, the worker 
must have separated from employment for lack of work and through no fault of his or 
her own (the worker cannot have quit or been discharged for cause)   that is, the 
worker must must meet the "separation" criteria for benefit eligibility. Third, the worker 
must be able to work, available for work, and seeking reemployment   that is, the 
worker must satisfy the "nonseparation" criteria for continuing benefit eligibility. 
Although these three criteria appear cut-and-dried, they can be misapplied in practice, 
and errors may arise. Workers who are in fact eligible for Ul benefits may be denied 
those benefits.
Since 1987, the U.S. Department of Labor has had a "Benefit Accuracy 
Measurement" system, or BAM (Skrable 1997; U.S. Department of Labor 1995), which 
performs random audits of Ul payments in order to estimate the extent of benefit 
overpayments. (On the development of this system, see Kingston and Burgess 1986; 
Burgess and Kingston 1987.) However, the Department has not estimated the 
accuracy of the process that determines benefit eligibility. In particular, the extent to 
which eligible claimants for Ul are wrongfully denied benefits has been unknown.
During 1997-98, the Department of Labor conducted a five-state Denied Claims 
Accuracy (DCA) Pilot Project in which random samples of denied Ul claims were 
subjected to intensive field investigation in order to determine their accuracy. The
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purpose of the pilot was twofold   to obtain information on extent of wrongful denial 
of Ul benefits, and to appraise the feasibility of an ongoing program that would 
estimate the accuracy of denied Ul claims.
This paper reports the main findings of that pilot project. Section 1 provides 
institutional background on Ul benefit eligibility, with special attention to the five states 
in which the pilot was conducted. Section 2 sketches the design of the pilot and 
indicates the some of the choices that were made in formulating that design. Section 3 
presents the main findings on the incidence of wrongful denials in each of the five pilot 
states and the extent to which appeals and Ul agencies' activities "automatically" 
correct errors. Section 4 examines the causes of errors and whether wrongful denials 
are correlated with observable characteristics of workers. Section 5 offers estimates of 
the dollar value of benefits lost by claimants due to wrongful denials. Section 6 
summarizes the findings and implications for policy that can be drawn from the pilot.
1. Ul Eligibility and Denial of Benefits
For the DCA Pilot Project, The Department of Labor selected five states from 
among a larger number that volunteered to participate in the project. The Department 
attempted to select a group of states that was reasonably balanced geographically, in 
size, and in features of the Ul law, and chose Nebraska, New Jersey. South Carolina, 
West Virginia, and Wisconsin. This section describes the Ul eligibility criteria used in 
those states and discusses the extent to which Ul claimants are denied benefits in both 
the pilot states and the United States as a whole.
1.1. Eligibility Criteria
Table 1 summarizes the Ul eligibility criteria of the five pilot states. Monetary 
eligibility criteria are characterized along four dimensions: (a) the type of eligibility
formula used, (b) the minimum base period earnings required (the base period is the 
first four of the five completed quarters preceding the Ul claim), (c) the earnings 
distribution requirement, and (d) the existence of restrictions on eligibility of seasonal 
workers.
Nebraska and West Virginia are among 6 states that use a so-called "flat" 
eligibility formula, under which a claimant must have earned some specified minimum 
dollar amount during the base period. New Jersey is one of 7 states requiring a 
claimant to have worked at least 20 weeks (at specified minimum weekly earnings) 
during the base period. South Carolina is one of 24 states using a "multiple of high- 
quarter wages" formula. South Carolina's formula requires a worker to have earned at 
least $600 in the high quarter of the base period (that is, the quarter of the base period 
in which earnings were highest) and at least 1.5 times the high-quarter earnings (that 
is, at least $900) in the entire base period. Finally, Wisconsin is one of 14 states using 
a "multiple of weekly benefit amount" formula. Wisconsin 1 s formula requires first that a 
worker have earned at least $1,325 in the high quarter of the base period, which 
would qualify the claimant for a weekly benefit amount of $53. The worker must then 
have earned at least 30 times that calculated weekly benefit amount (that is, at least 
$1,590) during the entire base period to be monetarily eligible.
The second row under monetary eligibility criteria gives the minimum base 
period earnings that a claimant would need in order to qualify for benefits. The third 
row shows each state's distribution requirement. For example, Nebraska requires the 
claimant to have earned at least $400 outside the high quarter of the base period. 
Similarly, the other five pilot states have some requirement that the claimant's base 
period earnings were not concentrated in a single quarter. For example, New Jersey, 
South Carolina, and West Virginia each require that a claimant have earnings in at 
least two quarters of the base period.
The fourth row under monetary eligibility criteria shows that West Virginia and 
Wisconsin have special provisions that restrict the eligibility of seasonal workers. In 
general, wages earned by workers in an industry defined as seasonal can be used to 
establish Ul eligibility only for unemployment during periods when the worker is 
usually employed in his or her seasonal job.
The middle panel of Table 1 summarizes the two main aspects of the pilot 
states's separation eligibility criteria. The first is how a state handles the Ul eligibility of 
a worker who voluntarily quit his or her job. Such a worker is eligible for Ul benefits 
only if he or she had "good cause" for quitting, and the definition of good cause differs 
from state to state. Table 1 shows that in New Jersey, West Virginia, and Wisconsin, 
the definition of "good cause" is restricted to issues directly related to work or the 
employer (although West Virginia and Wisconsin define certain specific reasons for 
voluntary leaving that are permitted, such as claimant illness and leaving to accept 
another job that does not materialize, with the number of such specific reasons shown 
in the "number of inclusions" row of Table 1.) Nebraska and South Carolina, on the 
other hand, allow "good cause" to include good personal reasons as well as reasons 
that are directly related to employment.
Table 1 also shows how long a claimant who quits voluntarily will be 
disqualified from receiving Ul benefits. In Nebraska, a worker who quits voluntarily is 
disqualified for 7 to 10 weeks. In the other pilot states, a worker who quits voluntarily is 
disqualified for the duration of his or her current spell of unemployment. In order to 
requalify for benefits, the worker must then earn some minimum amount, specified as a 
multiple of the weekly benefit amount in New Jersey, South Carolina, and Wisconsin. 
In West Virginia, the worker must work at least 30 days to requalify.
The second aspect of the separation criteria summarized in Table 1 pertains to 
discharge for misconduct. In the pilot states, a discharged will be ineligible for Ul
benefits for between 5 weeks (New Jersey) and 26 weeks (South Carolina). In 
addition, all of the pilot states except New Jersey reduce the benefits that a worker 
receives at the end of a misconduct disqualification. Also, all pilot states except 
Wisconsin impose some additional penalty on a worker who was discharged for gross 
misconduct.
The bottom panel of Table 1 summarizes the pilot states' nonseparation 
eligibility criteria. All require that a worker be "available" for work in some sense, 
although some states, such as South Carolina and West Virginia, require only that a 
worker be available to work in his or her usual occupation. Nebraska, New Jersey and 
Wisconsin, in contrast, require that a worker be available for (and willing to accept) any 
work. Also, in all of the pilot states, a worker who refuses suitable work is disqualified 
from receiving benefits for at least some time, and in two of the states (South Carolina 
and Wisconsin) such a worker is disqualified for the duration of his or her 
unemployment spell. Nebraska and West Virginia reduce the benefits that a worker 
receives at the end of a disqualification period stemming from refusal of suitable work.
1.2. Benefit Denials Nationwide and in the Pilot States
When a worker losses a job and claims Ul benefits, he or she files a new initial 
claim that is subjected to a monetary determination (to ensure that the claim satisfies 
the monetary eligibility criteria) and possibly also a separation determination (if there 
is a question about whether the claim meets the separation eligibility criteria). If a 
claimant is eligible, then he or she can claim up to the maximum benefit amount during 
the ensuing year (called a benefit year) by filing a succession of continued claims. 
usually every 2 weeks. The maximum benefit amount equals the claimant's weekly 
benefit amount times the number of weeks of benefits for which the claimant is eligible 
(typically 26). Each continued claim may receive a nonseparation determination if the
Ul agency has reason to believe that the claimant is not able, available, and seeking 
work (that is, did not satisfy the nonseparation eligibility criteria). Subjecting a claim to 
a separation or nonseparation determination is often referred to as adjudication.
The maximum benefit amount need not be paid in a sequence of consecutive 
weeks. Rather, a worker could become reemployed before receiving the maximum 
benefit amount, lose the new job, and file an additional initial claim, which may in turn 
receive a separation determination. Also, if a worker remains unemployed after a year, 
he or she may file a transitional claim, which could (if the claim satisfies the monetary 
eligibility criteria) result in a new maximum benefit amount that could be received 
during a new benefit year.
Table 2 summarizes information about the number of claims that were 
processed (or "determined") and their disposition during fiscal year 1998, both 
nationwide and in the five pilot states. Nationwide, nearly 10.8 million monetary 
determinations were made, and 10.9 percent of these resulted in denial of benefits 
(these are referred to as monetary denials). In the pilot states, 941,000 monetary 
determinations were made, and 10.6 percent of these resulted in denial of benefits. As 
a group, the pilot states seem reasonably representative of the nation as a whole.
As can be seen in the middle panel of Table 2, 15.9 million initial claims (both 
new and additional) were filed nationwide in 1998, of which 3.4 million (21.4 percent) 
were adjudicated. Of these, 1.86 million (or 54.4 percent) were ultimately denied 
(these are referred to a separation denials). In the five pilot states, 1.32 million initial 
claims were filed, of which 295,000 (22.4 percent) were adjudicated. Of these, 179,000 
(60.8 percent) were denied. The incidence of separation denials appears somewhat 
higher in the pilot states than in the nation as a whole.
The bottom panel of Table 2 shows that nationwide during 1998, nearly 118 
million continued claims were filed. Each of these events had the potential to result in
a nonseparation denial. Of these, 4.3 million (or 3.6 percent) were adjudicated, and of 
these latter, 2.4 million (or 55.9 percent) resulted in denied benefits. In the five pilot 
states, 11.2 million continued claims were filed, of which 265,000 (2.4 percent) were 
adjudicated. Of these, 161,000 (60.6 percent) were denied. The incidence of 
nonseparation denials appears to be somewhat lower in the pilot states than in the 
nation as a whole.
In what follows, it will be useful to keep in mind that about 10 to 11 percent of 
monetary determinations, and 55 to 60 percent of separation and nonseparation 
determinations, result in denial of benefits. It also needs to be kept in mind that, 
whereas all new initial and transitional claims are subjected to a monetary 
determination, only 22 percent of new initial, additional initial, and transitional claims 
are subjected to a separation determination (that is, adjudicated), and that only about 
3 percent of continued claims are subjected to a nonseparation determination.
2. Design of the Denied Claims Accuracy Pilot Project
For the DCA Pilot Project, Department of Labor officials decided to estimate the 
accuracy of denied Ul claims by drawing three separate samples of denied claims 
  one sample each for monetary, separation, and nonseparation denials   in each 
of the five pilot states. 1 The samples were drawn on a weekly basis, with 4 of each type 
of denial drawn at random each week until 200 denials of each type (600 total) had
1 The rationale for and development of the pilot program are traced in a series of Unemployment Insurance 
Program Letters (U.S. Department of Labor 1995, 1996a, 1996b). One alternative sampling design was 
considered for the pilot, in which a random sample of new initial claims would be drawn and added to a 
longitudinal file. The experience of each claimant would then be monitored and all denials investigated as 
they occurred. The Department of Labor cited two main reasons in choosing its simple random sampling 
design in preference to the longitudinal design. First, if one is interested in estimating the incidence of 
wrongful denials, it makes sense to sample denials directly, rather than sample initialclaims and then wait 
for denials to crop up. In fact, an important drawback to the longitudinal design is that it would be difficult to 
control the sample sizes of separation and (especially) nonseparation denials for investigation (recall from 
Table 2 that under 2 percent of continued claims are denied). Second, the design chosen mirrored the 
design of the existing BAM program (the program that estimates the extent of overpayments), so Ul 
information systems personnel in each state were already familiar with it.
been drawn. Hence, the pilot took place over the course of about one year (4 denials 
of each type per week times 50 weeks yielded 200 of each type of denial).The states 
began drawing samples for investigation in September 1997 and continued to sample 
during the following year. Site visits to each of the pilot states were made by 
Washington Ul office staff and by the authors for the purpose of monitoring the states' 
progress with the pilot and identifying problems.
At the heart of the pilot project was the intensive field investigation of each 
denial sampled. Each state received funding for two staff members to investigate the 
600 sampled denied claims and to code their findings on a Data Collection Instrument 
that was adapted from the BAM program. Most states spread the pilot caseload among 
more than two investigators; however, all investigators were experienced and 
specially trained personnel, and most were already working in the states' BAM unit.
How did the field investigations proceed? There were clearly variations among 
the states and among the investigators. However, monetary denials were generally 
investigated first by reviewing all pertinent agency records, then by interviewing 
(usually by phone) the claimant and contacting employers to ascertain the claimants' 
wages, hours of work, weeks of work, and so on, as prescribed by state law. Similarly, 
separation and nonseparation denials were investigated by reviewing existing agency 
records, then following up by contacting employers, the claimant, and (in some cases) 
third parties to determine whether the denial was in accord with fully informed 
application of state law. All investigated cases were reviewed by the supervisor of the 
BAM unit before being coded and transmitted to the Washington office. Note that the 
investigations went beyond a review of agency records already on file. This is the 
"field" aspect of the investigation, which embodies the assumption that existing agency 
records may be flawed and, in any case, must be verified.
3. Incidence of Wrongful Denials
Table 3 displays the main findings of the DCA Pilot Project  point estimates of 
the denial error rates in each of the five pilot states (and for the five states aggregated) 
for each of the three types of denials. Column 1 shows "unadjusted" error rates; that is, 
denial error rates before taking account of any corrections that result from claimants' 
appeals and Ul agencies' own checks. Columns 2, 3, and 4 show error rates that 
account for these corrective measures. We discuss each in turn.
3.1 Unadjusted Error Rates
Table 3 (column 1) shows that, for the five pilot states, 16 percent of sampled 
monetary denials, 8.7 percent of separation denials, and 15 percent of nonseparation 
denials were incorrect. The lower error rate of separation denials is consistent across 
the states (except for Wisconsin) and is too large overall to be attributed to sampling 
error. It seems clear that monetary and nonseparation denials are more likely to be 
incorrect than separation denials.
In large part, differences among the five pilot states in error rates can be 
attributed to sampling error. South Carolina's monetary denial error rate is statistically 
significantly higher than that of two of the other pilot states, Wisconsin's separation 
denial error rate is higher than that of three of the other states, and West Virginia's 
nonseparation denial error rate is lower than Wisconsin's, but otherwise the 
differences among the states are statistically insignificant. 2 During the pilot project, 
representatives of the pilot states made clear their belief that interstate differences in 
error rates should not be interpreted as interstate differences in the quality of agencies' 
enforcement efforts. In particular, the Ul laws, policies, and procedures of one state 
may be harder to apply than those of another, leading to interstate differences in error
2 Throughout this discussion, a "statistically significant" difference refers to a difference with a P-value of 
0.05 or less using a two-tailed test. Tests of differences in proportions are noted in the text but are not 
displayed in the tables. Such tests can be performed from data displayed in the tables.
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rates. It is difficult to appraise such arguments, but the relatively rare differences 
among the states in error rates makes such concerns largely moot.
3.2. Error Rates Adjusted for Appeals and Agencies' Actions
Ideally, a wrongful denial would be corrected by processes that are part of the 
Ul system   appeals filed by claimants who believe that they should be found eligible 
for Ul benefits and the agency's own checks and follow-up. Columns 2, 3, and 4 of 
Table 3 suggest the extent to which errors are corrected by appeals and the states' 
internal processes.
Column 2 shows that appeals filed by denied claimants had no effect on 
monetary denial errors. Indeed, only 7 of the 901 sampled monetary denials were 
appealed (this is not shown in the table), and all of these were correct monetary 
denials. There was no scope for appeals and redeterminations to correct wrongful 
monetary denials because none of them was appealed.
Column 2 also shows that appeals had only a slight effect on separation errors. 
Although 174 (or 17.3 percent) of the 1,006 separation denials were appealed, only 23 
of these were appeals of wrongful denials. (That is, only about 28 percent of the 
separation denial errors were appealed.) As a result, the scope for the appeals 
process to reduce separation denial errors is quite limited. At the time the data were 
transferred to the Department of Labor, only 39 of the 174 appeals had resulted in 
reversals (and of these, 24 were reversals of correct denials), and 64 were still 
pending. An additional 3 separation denials had been redetermined (all had been 
wrongful denials). The upshot is that appeals and redeterminations reduced the 
separation denial error rate for all five pilot states from 8.7 to 6.8 percent (this 
difference has a P-value of 0.12).
Finally, column 2 shows that appeals and redeterminations had little effect on
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wrongful nonseparation denials. Only 71 (or about 7 percent) of the 1,004 
nonseparation denials were appealed, and only 13 of these were appeals of wrongful 
denials. (That is, fewer than 9 percent of the wrongful nonseparation denials were 
appealed.) Hence, the scope for the appeals process to change the error rate for 
nonseparation denials is again limited. At the time the data were transferred to the 
Department of Labor, just 11 had resulted in reversals (of these, 6 were reversals of 
correct denials), and 35 were pending. An additional 3 nonseparation denials had 
been redetermined (all had been wrongful denials). As a result, appeals and 
redeterminations reduced the nonseparation denial error rate in five pilot states from 
15.0 to 14.1 percent (statistically insignificant).
It is worth noting that, even if the pending appeals of wrongful separation and 
nonseparation denials resulted in eligibility, few wrongful denials would be corrected. 
Only 3 of the pending separation denials that were appealed were wrongful, and only 
2 of the pending nonseparation denials that were appealed were wrongful.
Column 3 of Table 3 shows that agencies' actions to identify and correct 
wrongful denials reduced the monetary denial error rate from 16 percent to 11.2 
percent in the five pilot states taken together. (The reduction is statistically significant.) 
However, the agencies' actions did not significantly reduce either the separation or 
nonseparation error rates. In the five states together, agencies' actions reduced the 
separation error rate from 8.7 to 8.0 percent, and reduced the nonseparation error rate 
from 15.0 to 13.8 (neither difference is statistically significant).
Column 4 of Table 3 shows the combined effect of appeals, redeterminations, 
and agency actions on denial error rates. The monetary error rates in column 4 are 
lower than those in column 1 solely due to agency actions. In contrast, the separation 
and nonseparation error rates in column 4 are lower than those in column 1 due to a 
combination of appeals and agency actions. These adjusted error rates give a picture
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of the performance of the Ul system in determining benefit eligibility that reflects the 
checks that are built into the system. As such, they are preferred to the "raw" error 
rates. Adjusting for appeals and agency actions reduces the monetary and separation 
denial error rates by statistically significant amounts   from 16 to 11.2 percent for 
monetary errors and from 8.7 percent to 6.4 percent separation errors. Adjusting the 
nonseparation denial error rates results in a decrease in the estimated error rate from 
15 to 12.9 percent (P-value of 0.09).
4. Responsibility for and Causes of Errors
The denial error rates discussed above lead naturally to three questions. Were 
denials that occurred for certain reasons more error-prone than those that occurred for 
other reasons? Who was responsible for errors   the agency (due to misapplication 
of law and policy), the employer (due, for example, to failure to report wages), the 
claimant (due to misreporting), or some combination the three? Are there systematic 
causes of errors, and can these causes be identified so as to reduce or eliminate 
them? This section addresses these questions in turn.
4.1. Reasons for Denials
Table 4 displays information on the various reasons for monetary, separation, 
and nonseparation denials. The top panel shows the possible reasons for monetary 
denial: insufficient base period wages; insufficient hours, weeks, or days; failure to 
satisfy the high-quarter wage test; failure to meet a transitional work requirement; and 
"other" reasons. (These are the possibilities in the data collection instrument used in 
the pilot project, see U.S. Department of Labor, 1997.) Overall, failure to meet the base 
period wage test is the most common reason for a monetary denial, followed by failure 
to meet the high-quarter wage test and failure to meet a transitional work requirement.
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However, the evidence suggests that the reason given for a monetary denial is not 
related to the likelihood of error. For example, 14.3 percent of monetary denials due to 
insufficient wages were wrongful, whereas 17.2 percent of monetary denials due to 
failure of the high quarter wage test were wrongful; the difference is statistically 
insignificant, as are other pairwise differences between the percentages shown in the 
top panel of Table 4.
The second panel of Table 4 breaks down separation denials by reason and 
accuracy. Possible reasons for a separation denial include lack of work, voluntary quit, 
discharge, and not separated (still attached to a job, on a leave or absence, or the 
like). Overall, 60 percent of all separation denials occur because of a voluntary quit, 
and about 39 percent occur because of a discharge. As with monetary denials, 
however, the error rates for separation denials associated with different reasons are 
statistically the same. (The number of separation denials for "lack of work" and for "not 
separated" are so small that they have very large sampling error.)
The bottom panel of Table 4 breaks down nonseparation denials by reason and 
accuracy. Possible reasons for nonseparation denial include inability to work, 
unavailability for work, failure to meet the work search test, disqualifying or unreported 
income, refusal of suitable work, a reporting or registration violation (such as failure to 
report to the agency for an eligibility review interview), and "other." In the five pilot 
states combined, reporting and registration violations were the most common reason 
for a nonseparation denial (about 30 percent), followed by unavailability for work 
(about 24 percent), disqualifying income (18 percent), and inability to work (12 
percent). 3
3 Although it cannot be seen in Table 4, there is considerable variation across the pilot states in the 
importance of these main reasons for nonseparation denials. Reporting violations and disqualifying 
income dominate in Nebraska. Reporting violations and unavailability dominate in both New Jersey and 
West Virginia. Inability issues, disqualifying income, availability issues, reporting violations, and failure to 
meet the work search test are all significant in South Carolina. Unavailability, reporting violations, and 
disqualifying income are all significant in Wisconsin.
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Nonseparation denial error rates stemming from disqualifying income (24.9 
percent) are higher than nonseparation denial error rates stemming from any other 
reason, and the difference is statistically significant. This gap appears to result mainly 
from relatively high nonseparation error rates from disqualifying income in Nebraska 
and South Carolina. (Ul personnel in both Nebraska and South Carolina reported that 
disqualifying income provisions are difficult to administer.) Differences among the 
other error rates shown in the bottom panel of Table 4 are statistically insignificant.
4.2. Responsibility for Errors
Where does responsibility for wrongful denials lie? The Ul agency is an obvious 
possibility because it is responsible for correctly applying law and policy. However, 
employers could play a role if they fail to report or misreport wages, and claimants 
could play a role if they misreport their situation.
Table 5 displays data on the responsibility for the three types of wrongful 
denials. The data collection instrument used in the pilot project allowed investigators 
to code the agency, the employer, the claimant, third parties, or combinations of these 
as responsible for the wrongful denial. 4
The first column of Table 5 shows that responsibility for 78 percent of the 
wrongful monetary denials was attributable to the agency or to the employer (either 
individually or together), without any shared claimant responsibility. Specifically, 
responsibility for 32.6 percent of the errors was assigned to the agency, responsibility 
for 38.3 percent of the errors was assigned to the employer, and responsibility for 7.1 
percent of the errors was assigned to the employer and the agency jointly. (Although 
not shown, this pattern holds across the five pilot states, with at least 65 percent of the 
wrongful monetary denials attributable to the employer or the agency in each state.)
4 Fewer wrongful denials are shown in Table 5 than in Table 3 because error issue data are missing for a 
few of the wrongful denials.
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Employer misreporting or failure to report workers' earnings is the most common 
cause of wrongful monetary denials, with agency errors a close second.
The second column of Table 5 displays data on responsibility for separation 
denial errors. The agency (alone) was responsible for about two-thirds of the wrongful 
separation denials in the five pilot states. Claimants and employers bore responsibility 
for only small percentages of wrongful denials.
The third column of Table 5 displays data on responsibility for nonseparation 
denial errors. As in the case of separation denial errors, responsibility for about two- 
thirds of all nonseparation denial errors can be attributed to the agency.
Because Ul agencies and employers bear most of the responsibility of wrongful 
denials, it is useful to examine additional data on the actions of agencies and 
employers. The middle panel of Table 5 shows data on how the Ul agency handled 
wrongful denials. In particular, the investigator coded the actions that were being taken 
(or had already been taken) by the Ul agency at the time of the investigation. The first 
column shows that the agency could not have detected 39 percent of wrongful 
monetary denials (due to employer misreporting) and was already resolving about 31 
percent of the wrongful monetary denials. In the remaining cases (about 30 percent), 
the agency had taken the wrong action, did not identify an issue, or had not followed 
procedures.
For wrongful separation and nonseparation denials, the agency had taken 
incorrect action, failed to identify an issue, or not followed procedures in a far higher 
percentage of cases   about 70 percent. For wrongful separation and nonseparation 
denials, the agency could not have detected the issue in only about 20 percent of the 
cases, and was already resolving fewer than 10 percent of the cases. These findings 
on prior agency action are consistent with the data on responsibility for errors 
discussed above.
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The bottom panel of Table 5 displays data on the adequacy and timeliness of 
the information given by employers in wrongful denials. The data show whether, by the 
time of the DCA investigation, the employer had provided adequate and timely 
information, had not responded, had not been asked for information, or there was no 
employer-related issue. These data suggest that employers' provision of inadequate 
or untimely information was most likely to be a problem in the case of wrongful 
monetary denials, and least likely to be a problem in the case of nonseparation 
denials. Specifically, for about 52 percent of the wrongful monetary denials, about 22 
percent of the wrongful separation denials, and about 11 percent of the wrongful 
nonseparation denials, the employer either had not responded or had provided 
information that was inadequate or late. (For 73 percent of the wrongful nonseparation 
denials, there was either no employer issue or no information was requested of the 
employer.) Again, these findings are consistent with the findings on error responsibility 
displayed in the top panel of Table 5. (For example, the finding that about 52 percent 
of all wrongful monetary denials are the responsibility of the employer, the employer 
and agency jointly, or the claimant and employer jointly is consistent with the finding 
that 52 percent of monetary denial errors involved inadequate or untimely employer 
information.)
4.3. Errors and the Characteristics of Workers
Do wrongfully denied claims differ systematically from claims that are correct, or 
are wrongful denials essentially random accidents? To the extent that wrongful denials 
do have a systematic component, it should be possible to direct or "target" resources 
toward the types of denied claims that tend to be in error and to avert some of the 
errors. Doing so would be an efficient way of reducing the overall error rate. On the 
other hand, if wrongful denials occur at random, then the error rate could be reduced
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only by devoting greater resources overall to eligibility determination. Reducing the 
error rate would entail greater efforts to obtain information from all parties, greater 
resources devoted to training decision-makers, and more time spent in making each 
decision.
This section examines the extent to which there is a systematic component to 
errors that occur in each of the three types of eligibility determination. The approach is 
to estimate a linear probability model for each type of determination in which a dummy 
variable indicating whether a denial was correct (1 if correct, 0 if wrongful) is regressed 
on the following observable characteristics of each denied claimant:
  age of the denied claimant in years
  gender of the denied claimant (0 if female; 1 if male)
  whether the claimant was a U.S. citizen (0 if not a citizen; 1 if a citizen)
  ethnicity of the claimant (dummy variables for black, Hispanic, Asian/Pacific 
Islander, American Indian, and nonhispanic white)
  level of schooling completed [dummy variables for less than high school, high 
school graduate or GED, some college but no degree, college degree 
(including associates or higher degree)]
  normal wage in the usual job, in dollars per hour (dummy variables for usual 
wage rate less than $6 an hour, between $6 and $7 an hour, between $7 and 
$12 an hour, and over $12 an hour).
In addition to the above claimant characteristics, each regression includes a set 
of dummy variables indicating the state in which the individual claimed Ul benefits. 
(Because of missing variables in Nebraska, the denials are drawn only from New 
Jersey, South Carolina, West Virginia, and Wisconsin.) Also, each of the three 
equations estimated includes a set of variables specific to type of denial under 
consideration. In the equation for monetary denials, a dummy variable is included 
indicating whether the denial involved a combined wage claim (that is, a claim that 
combines earnings from one or more employers in another state in order to establish 
monetary eligibility). In the equation for separation denials, dummy variables are 
included indicating whether the denial involved a voluntary quit, a discharge, or some
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other separation issue. And in the equation for nonseparation denials, dummy 
variables are included indicating whether the denial involved ability to work, 
availability for work, a work search issue, refusal of work, a reporting or registration 
violation, or some other nonseparation issue. The reason for including these variables 
in the estimated equation is to see whether denials involving one or another specific 
issue are more likely to be wrongful.
4.3.1. Monetary denials. The first column of Table 6 shows estimates of the 
wrongful monetary denial equation. Apart from the constant and the coefficient of one 
of the state dummy variables, only four estimated coefficients in the model are 
statistically different from zero at the 5-percent level or better: the age coefficient, two of 
the usual wage coefficients, and the combined wage claim coefficient. For a worker 
aged 30, the probability that a denial is correct is lower by .003 than for a worker aged 
29. (It follows that the monetary denial of a 40-year-old worker is less likely to be 
correct by 0.03 than is the monetary denial of a 30-year-old.) The coefficient for usual 
wage less than $6 per hour suggests that, for a worker whose usual hourly wage rate 
is less than $6 per hour, the probability that a monetary denial is correct is higher by 
0.166 than for a worker whose usual hourly wage is greater than $12 per hour (the 
reference group). For a combined wage claim, the probability that a monetary denial is 
correct is lower by 0.437 than for a denial that does not involve a combined wage 
claim.
These results suggest that there is at least some systematic component to the 
incidence of wrongful monetary denials   that wrongful monetary denials are not 
wholly random accidents. Monetary denials of older workers, workers with high usual 
wages, and combined wage claims are all more likely to be wrongful than are other 
denials. It is not surprising that combined wage claims are relatively error-prone 
because combined wage claims require cooperation and coordination between Ul
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agencies in two states. That monetary denials of older workers and workers with 
higher usual wages are more error-prone may be more surprising. However, the 
finding needs to be interpreted carefully and in light of the fact that relatively few high- 
wage and older workers are denied. The results suggest that, conditional on being 
denied on monetary grounds, older workers and higher-wage workers are more likely 
to experience a wrongful monetary denial.
4.3.2. Separation denials. The middle column of Table 6 shows estimates 
of the wrongful separation denial equation. These estimates suggest two points. First, 
the very few separation denials that involve issues other than voluntary quits or 
discharges are less likely to be correct than are the more common separation denials 
(those that do involve voluntary quits and discharges). Second, separation denials of 
American Indians are less likely to be proper than are the separation denials of other 
racial or ethnic groups. This would be a troubling result except that it is based on just 
one case. Otherwise, the model suggests that separation denials are random 
accidents that have no systematic component.
4.3.3. Nonseparation denials. The right-most column of Table 6 shows 
estimates of the wrongful nonseparation denial equation. These estimates yield a 
conclusion that is similar to the one just drawn for separation denials: Nonseparation 
denials are largely random events. There is only one exception: Nonseparation 
denials that involve disqualifying income are less likely to be proper than are 
nonseparation denials that involve other issues.
Overall, the linear probability models in Table 6 suggest relatively few ways that 
Ul agencies could target their resources so as to reduce wrongful denials. 
Nevertheless, giving extra scrutiny to certain identifiable cases could reduce the 
incidence of wrongful denials   to monetary denials involving combined wage claims 
and of older workers and high-wage workers, to separation denials for reasons other
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than discharge or voluntary quit, and to nonseparation denials for disqualifying 
income.
5. Value of Benefits Lost Due to Wrongful Denials
The denial error rates discussed in section 3 are the basic results of the DCA 
Pilot Project. However, it is reasonable to ask what those error rates imply about the 
dollar value of benefits that should have been paid but were not. It is not possible to 
estimate the value of lost benefits in the way the incidence of wrongful denials has 
been estimated   the benefits that would have been received by a wrongfully denied 
claimant are not observable. As a result, it is necessary to impute the benefits lost due 
to wrongful denials. This section develops two sets of imputations of the value of lost 
benefits.
Total benefits lost due to wrongful denials equal the product of three factors:
  the number of wrongful denials (Nj, where i indexes the type of denial);
  the average weekly benefit amount of workers wrongfully denied (WBAj);
  the average number of weeks of benefits lost by workers wrongfully denied 
(WKSj).
For example, for claimants wrongfully denied for monetary reasons, the total benefits 
lost (LOSSm) during FY 1998 would be:
LOSSm = Nm'WBAm-WKSm
It follows that an imputation of lost benefits requires estimates of Nj, WBAj, and WKSj. 
We discuss each in turn.
5.1. Number of Wrongful Denials
In order to estimate the number of wrongful denials in the United States, it is 
necessary to assume that the estimates of wrongful denials in the five pilot states
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approximate the incidence of wrongful denials in the United States as a whole. If this 
assumption is accepted, then the number of wrongful denials in the United States 
during fiscal year 1998 can be imputed by applying Table 3's estimates of wrongful 
denial incidence to Table 2's data on the number of denials of each type.
Table 2 shows that there were 1.17 million monetary denials, 1.86 separation 
denials, and 2.39 million nonseparation denials. Table 3 shows that the incidence of 
wrongful monetary, separation, and nonseparation denials was 0.112, 0.064, and 
0.129. Applying these incidence rates to the national totals yields 131,264 wrongful 
monetary denials, 118,976 wrongful separation denials, and 286,800 wrongful 
nonseparation denials. The number of wrongful monetary denials must be reduced 
because 24.7 percent of monetarily eligible claimants did not receive a first benefit 
payment during 1998. 5 Hence, the imputed number of wrongful monetary denials is 
98,842 (131,264-0.753). The first column of Table 7 shows the resulting imputations.
5.2. Weekly Benefit Amount of Wrongfully Denied Claimants
The next requirement is an estimate of the WBA that wrongfully denied 
claimants would have received. This will differ among the three types of erroneous 
denials. The corrected WBA for each wrongfully denied claimant in the DCA Pilot 
Project is known   it was calculated and coded by the field investigator. Also known 
is the WBA of the average paid claim in the pilot states (from BAM program data). To 
impute an average WBA for wrongfully denied claimants throughout the United States, 
a "relative WBA" for each type of wrongful denial can be constructed as follows:
WBAj/WBA
where the numerator is the average WBA of wrongfully denied claimants of type i in 
the pilot states (i = monetary, separation, and nonseparation), and the denominator is
5 There are two reasons for this. First, some monetarily eligible claimants turn out to be ineligible for 
nonmonetary reasons. Second, some monetarily eligible claimants find a job quickly or drop out of the 
labor force, and never receive a benefit payment as a result.
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the average WBA of paid claimants in the five pilot states. For wrongful monetary 
denials, this WBA factor is 0.859; for wrongful separation denials, it is 0.866; and for 
wrongful nonseparation denials, it is 0.909 (see the column headed "relative WBA" in 
Table 7). The average WBA for wrongfully denied claimants of each type in the United 
States is imputed by taking the product of the average WBA of paid claimants in the 
United States ($199.18, from the BAM data) and the respective WBA factor.
5.3. Weeks of Benefits Lost
Finally, the number of weeks of benefits lost by workers wrongfully denied must 
be imputed for each type of denial. Two alternative imputations are used here. The first 
is based on observed benefit durations of correctly determined claimants (these are 
shown in panel A of Table 7). The second are based on regression models (these are 
shown in panel B of Table 7). Each set of imputations is described in turn.
5.3.1. Observed benefit durations. The number of weeks of benefits lost 
due to a wrongful monetary denial can be imputed as the number of weeks 
compensated per first payment (that is, the sum of first and subsequent spells of 
benefit receipt in a given benefit year) for the average correctly determined claimant. In 
fiscal year 1998, the average number of weeks compensated in the United States was 
14.2 (ETA 5159 reports). This is used in panel A of Table 7 as an imputation of the 
number of weeks of benefits lost due to a wrongful monetary denial.
For wrongful separation denials, the average number of weeks compensated 
overstates the number of weeks of benefits lost. There are two reasons for this. First, 
many separation denials (especially for misconduct issues) are for a fixed number of 
weeks (see Table 1). Hence, many separation denials are shorter than the duration of 
unemployment. Second, many separation denials apply to additional initial claims 
(rather than new initial claims), which are necessarily associated with relatively short
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spells of benefit receipt (because some weeks of benefits have already been used up). 
During 1998, 61.2 percent of initial claims were new, and 38.8 percent were additional 
(ETA 5159 reports). In 1990-1993, across fifteen states for which survey data are 
available (Battelle Memorial Institute 1999, Table 7-1), the average benefit duration for 
first spells of unemployment was about twice the duration of subsequent spells (the 
mean first spell was 13.18 weeks long, and the mean subsequent spell was 6.16 
weeks long).
If the duration of subsequent spells in 1998 was roughly half that of first spells, 
then the average number of compensated weeks associated with an additional initial 
claim would be about 7.1 (half of 14.2). Hence, if all separation denials were for the 
duration of unemployment, the mean duration of a separation denial would be 11.4 
weeks [= (0.612-14.2) + (0.388-7.1)]. (This also assumes that the rates of adjudication 
for reasons of separation are the same for new and additional claims.) The figure 
would be somewhat lower if account were taken of the fact that some separation 
denials are for fixed periods that are shorter than the duration of the spell. In any case, 
panel A of Table 7 uses 11.4 weeks as the imputed number of weeks of benefits lost 
due to wrongful separation denials.
Most difficulty arises in estimating the number of weeks of benefits lost due to a 
wrongful nonseparation denial. A claimant who is denied because he or she is unable 
to work or unavailable for work loses one week of benefits. However, many 
nonseparation denials, such as those for refusing suitable work and for violating a 
requirement to report to the agency, result in penalties that cover several weeks or the 
remainder of the current unemployment spell (see again Table 1). To obtain an 
estimate of the number of weeks of benefits lost due to a wrongful nonseparation 
denial, we first impute the average duration of multi-week penalties, then take a 
weighted average of the duration of multi-week and single-week penalties.
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Three assumptions are needed to obtain an imputation of the average duration 
of a multi-week penalty. First, the average nonseparation penalty is assessed at the 
midpoint of a spell of benefit receipt (so that the average multi-week penalty cuts off 
half the compensated weeks of unemployment). Second, nonseparation penalties are 
equally likely to be assessed on new initial and additional initial claims. Third, the 
average duration of a spell of unemployment resulting from an additional claim is half 
the duration of a spell resulting from a new initial claim (as assumed above). These 
assumptions imply that the average duration of a multi-week nonseparation penalty 
(PENmw) can be imputed as:
PENmw = P(0.5-DUR) + (1-P)(0.25-DUR) (1) 
In equation (1), P denotes the proportion of initial claims that are new. DUR is the 
average duration of benefit receipt, so 0.5-DUR is the number of weeks of benefits that 
are cut off by the average multi-week penalty on a new claim (the first assumption is 
that average multi-week penalty cuts off half the compensated weeks of 
unemployment). Also, (1-P) denotes the proportion of claims that are additional, and 
(0.25-DUR) is the number of weeks that are cut off by the average multi-week penalty 
on an additional claim (the third assumption is that the average duration of an 
additional claim is half that of a new claim). For the United States in 1998, DUR was 
13.9 weeks, and P was 0.612, so PENmw was 5.6 weeks.
The imputed average duration of all nonseparation penalties is the weighted 
average of durations of multi-week and one-week penalties. Of all nonseparation 
penalties in the United States in 1998, 42.3 percent were multi-week (derived from 
U.S. Department of Labor 207 reports), so the imputed average of all nonseparation 
penalties was 2.94 weeks (= 5.6*0.423 + 1.00-0.577). Both panels of Table 7 use this 
imputation for the number of weeks of benefits lost due to a wrongful separation
denial.
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5.3.2. Regression-based estimates. The above estimates of the number of 
weeks of benefits lost by workers wrongfully denied benefits may seem somewhat ad 
hoc. A preferred procedure might be to generate regression-based estimates of the 
number of weeks of benefits that would have been received by claimants who were 
wrongfully denied. In the interest of brevity, the procedure is described and the results 
given without displaying all the underlying regression results. 6 First, a sample of 
claimants who were correctly determined eligible for Ul benefits is used to estimate a 
benefit duration function. This is done by regressing the number of weeks of benefits 
received during the benefit year on the claimant's individual characteristics (age, 
gender, citizenship, ethnicity, and schooling), the claimant's usual hourly wage, 
weekly benefit amount, potential duration of benefits, and the season in which the 
initial claim was filed.7 Second, the estimated coefficients of the regression equation 
are used to impute the expected benefit duration of claimants who were wrongfully 
denied benefits. For wrongful monetary denials, this is done by substituting the 
average characteristics of claimants who were wrongfully denied for monetary reasons 
into the estimated duration function and solving. For wrongful separation denials, this 
is done by substituting the average characteristics of claimants who were wrongfully 
denied for separation reasons into the estimated benefit duration function, solving, and 
then subtracting the average number of weeks of benefits that had already been 
received by claimants wrongfully denied for separation reasons. 8 Note that the 
regression procedure is not appropriate for estimating the weeks of benefits lost due to 
wrongful nonseparation denials because many nonseparation denials are for a fixed
6 A full description of the results is included in the DCA Pilot Project final report.
7 To account for the the empirical distribution of unemployment durations, the error term of the regression 
is assumed to have the Weibull distribution, and maximum likelihood is used to estimate the model (see, 
for example, Lancaster 1979).
8 Some claimants who were wrongfully denied for separation reasons had received benefits at the time of 
their wrongful denial because they were filing an additional initial claim. They had met the conditions of 
separation on their new initial claim and hence received benefits, but the conditions of separation on their 
additional initial claim   the claim that was subject to the DCA investigation   were viewed as 
unsatisfactory (wrongly, according to the investigation).
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number of weeks rather than for the remainder of the unemployment spell. 
Accordingly, the imputation of weeks lost due to wrongful nonseparation denials that 
was derived in section 5.3.1 is maintained.
The above procedure requires a sample of claimants who were correctly 
determined eligible for benefits and for whom the completed spell of unemployment 
can be observed. The BAM samples for the five pilot states would be natural 
candidates for this approach. However, the BAM samples include data on interrupted 
spells of unemployment (not completed spells) because the BAM investigation applies 
to a specific week during a claimant's benefits year, not the completed benefit year. To 
get around this problem, the Quality Control Division in one of the pilot states   South 
Carolina  added the needed data to its BAM records from the time period of the DCA 
Pilot Project. 9
The results of the regression-based imputations suggest that, if they had been 
correctly determined eligible for benefits, claimants wrongfully denied for monetary 
reasons would have received about 10 percent fewer weeks of benefits than eligible 
claimants. (Specifically, the average characteristics of wrongfully denied claimants 
imply that they would have received 90.9 percent of the weeks of benefits received by 
claimants who were correctly determined eligible.) The imputations also suggest that 
claimants wrongfully denied for separation reasons would have received about 32 
percent fewer weeks of benefits than other eligible claimants. (This latter imputation 
takes account of both the characteristics of wrongfully denied claimants and the fact 
that those claimants had received, on average, 4.2 weeks of benefits before being 
wrongfully denied.)
The regression-based imputations of benefit duration are displayed in panel B
9 The South Carolina group drew data on benefits paid during the full benefit year for each claimant in the 
BAM sample for September 1997 through August 1998. These data were identified by batch and 
sequence number, so that they could be matched back to the BAM benefits master file and used in 
estimation. The effort was carried out by Leiand Teal, Bob Branham, Layne Waters, and Doug Potter of 
the South Carolina Employment Security Commission, to whom we are most grateful.
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of Table 7. The imputed number of weeks lost as a result of a wrongful monetary 
denial is 12.9 (= 14.2-0.908), and the imputed number of weeks lost as a result of a 
wrongful separation denial is 9.6 (= 14.2-0.679).
5.4. Results
The rightmost two columns of Table 7 display the results of the two imputations. 
The imputations in panel A suggest that $625 million were lost to claimants nationwide 
during fiscal year 1998 due to wrongful denials. Roughly $240 million were lost due to 
wrongful monetary denials, $234 million due to wrongful separation denials, and $151 
million due to wrongful nonseparation denials. The rightmost column shows that the 
average monetary error resulted in lost benefits of $2,430; the average separation 
error resulted in lost benefits of $1,966; and the average nonseparation error resulted 
in lost benefits of $527.
The imputations in panel B suggest that $566 million were lost to claimants 
nationwide during fiscal year 1998 due to wrongful denials. About $218 million were 
lost due to wrongful monetary denials, $197 million due to wrongful separation 
denials, and (as in panel A) $151 million due to wrongful nonseparation denials. The 
average monetary error resulted in lost benefits of $2,200; the average separation 
error resulted in lost benefits of $1,656; and the average nonseparation error resulted 
(again) in lost benefits of $527.
The imputations in panel A suggest that the benefits lost due to wrongful denials 
amounted to 3.4 percent of total regular Ul benefits paid during 1998 (the latter 
amounted to $18.4 billion.) The imputations in panel B suggest that the benefits lost 
due to wrongful denials amounted to 3.1 percent of Ul benefits paid during 1998.
It seems clear from the imputations that the biggest bang for the administrative 
buck is likely to be found in reducing errors in monetary and separation
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determinations. This conclusion assumes that investigation costs are similar for the 
three types of determinations. In a cost-benefit framework, one would need to compare 
the cost of investigation (which may differ across the three types of determinations) 
with the expected benefits resulting from those investigations (that is, the benefit 
payments received by claimants otherwise wrongfully denied).
6. Discussion and Policy Implications
Increasing attention is being focused on the Ul system because of the role it can 
play in maintaining the incomes of former welfare recipients who have joined the labor 
force as a result of welfare reform. These workers can be expected to be vulnerable to 
layoff in a recession and (possibly) to have relatively volatile work histories. The 
presence of these workers in the labor force increases the importance of ensuring that 
workers who are eligible for benefits actually receive them.
The DCA Pilot Project drew random samples of denied Ul claims and subjected 
those denied claims to an intensive field investigation to determine their accuracy. The 
findings suggest that, after adjusting for appeals, redeterminations, and agency 
actions to resolve errors, 11 percent of monetary denials, over 6 percent of the 
separation denials, and 13 percent of nonseparation denials were wrongful (see Table 
3). These are substantial proportions, and they raise questions about what state Ul 
agencies could do to reduce the incidence of wrongful denials.
The field investigations allow one to address several questions about 
wrongfully denied claims. First, to what extent to appeals and normal agency 
procedures lead to correction of wrongful denials? It is clear that the appeals process 
corrects few if any wrongful monetary or nonseparation denials, and only weak 
evidence exists that appeals are significant in correcting wrongful separation denials 
(Table 3). Agency procedures, on the other hand, do correct a substantial number of
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wrongful monetary denials, although they correct few in any wrongful separation or 
nonseparation denials.
Second, where does responsibility for wrongful denials lie? The answer varies 
with the type of denial. Responsibility for wrongful monetary denials falls more often on 
employers than on agencies or claimants. Employer errors in reporting the earnings of 
workers are responsible for over half of all wrongful monetary denials, and suggest the 
importance of auditing employers to ensure compliance with the Ul payroll tax 
(Burgess, Blakemore, and Low 1998). Wrongful separation and nonseparation 
denials, on the other hand, are more likely to be the responsibility of the agencies 
  over half of such errors can be attributed to incorrect agency action.
Third, are wrongful denials correlated with observable claimant characteristics? 
In general, the answer is that the correlations between errors and observable 
characteristics are not strong. However, it appears that monetary denials of older 
workers and high-wage workers, as well as those involving combined wage claims, 
are relatively prone to error. Nonseparation denials for disqualifying income are also 
relatively error-prone.
The benefits lost due to wrongful denials are substantial   imputations 
developed in section 5 suggest that benefit losses are on the order of $560 million to 
$625 million annually, or over 3 percent of all regular state benefits paid to workers. 
The findings suggest that two types of measures could be taken to mitigate these 
losses. First, efforts to ensure that employers report wages earned by workers correctly 
and in timely fashion could substantially reduce wrongful monetary denials. Second, 
better training of claims-takers and adjudicators (and efforts to retain experienced 
personnel) could reduce wrongful separation and nonseparation denials. The 
resources needed to achieve these goals (which have not been addressed) would 
need to be balanced against the benefits that would result from an improved system.
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Table 1
Ul eligibility criteria in states participating in the DCA Pilot Project, 1997
State
Eligibility Criteria Nebraska New Jersey South Carolina West Virginia Wisconsin
Monetary
Formula Flat 
Minimum earnings $1,200 
Distribution >$400






to work-related issues no 







period (weeks) 7-10 
Earnings to
requalify
Benefits reduced yes 
Added penalty
for gross misconduct yes
Nonseparation
Able and available for: 
Any work yes 
Suitable work no 
Usual work no






































































Notes: See text (section 1) for discussion. "HQ" refers to high quarter; "WBA" refers to weekly benefit 
amount; "Duration" refers to disqualification for the duration of the current unemployment spell. 
Sources: U.S. Department of Labor, Comparison of State Unemployment Insurance Laws (1997); 
Advisory Council on Unemployment Insurance (1995, Chapters 7 and 8 ), Nicholson (1997), Anderson 
(1997), and the laws of the five pilot states.
Table 2
Unemployment insurance eligibility, by type of determination and outcome,
United States and five pilot states, fiscal year 1998
(figures in thousands)
United Five pilot 
Monetary Determinations States states
New initial and transitional claims 10,782 941 
Insufficient wage credits 1,172 100
Proportion with insufficient wage credits 0.109 0.106 
Separation Determinations
New initial and additional initial claims 15,910 1,320
Issue/adjudicated 3,416 295
Denied 1,859 179
Proportion of initial claims adjudicated 0.214 0.224
Proportion of adjudicated claims denied 0.544 0.608
Proportion of initial claims denied 0.117 0.136
Nonseparation Determinations
Continued claims 117,591 11,238
Issue/adjudicated 4,276 265
Denied 2,390 161
Proportion of continued claims adjudicated 0.036 0.024
Proportion of adjudicated claims denied 0.559 0.606
Proportion of continued claims denied 0.020 0.014
Sources: ETA 218 reports (monetary determinations); ETA 207 reports (separation and nonseparation 
determinations).
Table 3
Denial error rates, unadjusted and adjusted for appeals, redeterminations, and agency
resolution of issues, by state and for the five pilot states
(percentage of denials found in error, with standard errors in parentheses)






























































































































Source: Tabulated from Denied Claims Accuracy Pilot records for September 1997 through September 
1998. Missing cases excluded.
Table 4
Accuracy of denials by reason for denial






Failure of high quarter wage test


































































































Source: Tabulated from reason for monetary denial code, reason for separation code, and reason for 
nonseparation determination code (all in master table) Denied Claims Accuracy Pilot records for 
September 1997 through September 1998.
Table 5
Responsibility for, prior agency action on, and prior employer action on wrongful
denials, by type of denial, five pilot states
(percentages with number of cases)
________Type of erroneous denial________
Monetary Separation Nonseparation 
Responsibility for error
Third party 0.7 0.0 2.0
Agency 32.6 66.3 67.1
Employer 38.3 9.3 0.7
Employer and agency 7.1 3.5 2.7
Claimant 7.8 11.6 2.7
Claimant and agency 5.7 7.0 12.8
Claimant and employer 7.1 1.2 8.1
Claimant, employer, and agency 0.7 1.2 3.4
Number of cases 141 86 149
Prior agency action on error
Investigation determined agency:
Could not detect issue 39.0 19.8 22.2 
Was already resolving issue 31.2 8.1 8.7 
Took incorrect action 9.2 55.8 51.0 
Did not identify issue 9.2 9.3 6.0 
Did not follow procedures 10.6 7.0 12.1
Number of cases 141 86 149
Prior employer action on error
Employer's information was:
Adequate and timely 24.3 57.0 16.1
Adequate and late 5.7 0.0 0.0
Inadequate and timely 30.0 16.3 5.4
Inadequate and late 4.3 0.0 1.3
Employer did not respond 12.1 5.8 4.0
No information requested 10.0 17.4 6.7
No employer issue 13.6 3.5 66.4
Number of cases 140 86 149
Source: Tabulated from Denied Claims Accuracy Pilot records (error responsibility code, prior agency 
action codes, and prior employer action code in error issue table).
Table 6
Characteristics of claimants and the likelihood of correct denial
(Ordinary least squares estimates with standard errors in parentheses; dependent variable equals 1 if
















Wage in usual job: 
less than $6/hr
$6 to $7/hr 








































































































































































































Notes: Standard errors in parentheses.
* denotes significance at 5% level; ** denotes significance at 1% level, 
"ref denotes reference category in a set of dummy variables, 
"na" denotes variable not included in the equation.
- denotes variable dropped because there are no corresponding observations in the sample.
Table 7





























B: Estimates based in Weibull model of weeks of benefits lost



































Source: Authors' estimates, described in text. Numbers of wrongful denials are imputed by applying the 
incidence of wrongful denials (Table 3) to the number of denials in the U.S. during the year (Table 2). U.S. 
WBA is the average weekly benefit amount of eligible Ul claimants throughout the U.S. during fiscal year 
1998 (from Benefit Accuracy Measurement data for 1998). Relative WBA is the ratio of the corrected WBA 
of wrongfully denied claimants in the five pilot states (from the DCA Pilot Project data) to the average WBA 
of eligible claimants in the five pilot states. Denial durations in panel A are imputations from available Ul 
administrative data (described in section 5.3). Denial durations in panel B are imputations based on 
Weibull models of benefit duration (described in section 5.3.2).
